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Christopher Skeaff's Becoming Political aspires simultaneously to offer a new 
interpretation of Spinoza's political philosophy, and also to engage with contemporary 
political theory. 
 
Substantively, the book articulates and defends an ideal of democratic politics 
whereby the state is open to its own reconstitution and internal transformation. Such 
an ideal stands opposed to the tendency in democratic theory and practice to try to fix 
the bounds of democracy: whether through a sovereigntist view of politics (whereby 
democracy just means implementing the sovereign decision of the democratic 
assembly); but equally through a moral view of politics (whereby philosophers 
attempt to define and codify in advance the norms of appropriate democratic 
decisionmaking). On my reading, Skeaff envisions a sovereign state making laws, but 
he proposes that the sovereign's rule must exist in agonistic relation with citizens 
debating, contesting, reformulating, and resisting those same laws. Citizen judgment 
challenges both specific laws, but also and more importantly it challenges meta-level 
considerations of what counts as fair game for political debate and of who belongs in 
the political community. In other words, citizen judgment dynamically regulates the 
very boundaries of politics: hence the book's title Becoming Political. This vision is 
'agonistic' both insofar as it refuses to lay down any definitive principles or norms of 
political life, and also insofar as it refuses to resolve the ongoing contestation between 
the state and the populace in favour of one side or the other. It may be possible to 
some degree for a sovereign state to shut down such citizen judgment, but it is 
normatively undesirable for it to do so. 
 
Skeaff's agonistic vision becomes clear incrementally across the book's five chapters. 
Successive chapters draw out this same agonistic structure within different contexts of 
Spinoza's political corpus. For instance, Chapter 1 interprets Spinoza's famous 
advocacy of a right to philosophise in terms of the interaction between the sovereign's 
'jurisdiction' (its right to proclaim laws) and citizens' 'jurisprudence' (their popular 
contestation of laws). For another instance, Chapter 2 interprets Spinoza's analysis of 
the dynamics of human affect in terms of the interplay between our mimetic desire for 
sameness (and the hope for harmony that it expresses) and the more ethical and 
rational desire for alliance across difference (even as it brings with it ineradicable 
conflict). A similar structure is at play in Chapter 3's contrast between rule by law and 
rule of law; Chapter 4's contrast between theology supporting sovereignty and 
theology transforming sovereignty; and Chapter 5's contrast between democracy as 




In putting forward such an ideal of politics, Skeaff builds on several diverse existing 
traditions of politics focussed on non-domination: the Italian biopolitical tradition 
(Negri); the analytic republican tradition (Pettit); and the tradition taking judgment as 
politics' most distinctive term (Arendt). I take it that the book's primary contribution 
for contemporary political theory is a positive effort to synthesise and enrich the ideas 
of these other thinkers that Skeaff finds appealing. But what is the deficiency to be 
addressed? What precisely does Spinoza offer to this already dense theoretical 
landscape? 
 
In Skeaff's hands, Spinoza's two key conceptual contributions are 'vital republicanism' 
and 'democratic judgment'. Neither of these are terms explicitly used by Spinoza; 
rather they are Skeaff's original efforts to organise and systematise the structure of 
Spinoza's political thought. The first, 'vital republicanism', points towards a 
conception of political life as having its own immanent norms; the second, 
'democratic judgment', specifies the conditions under which those immanent norms 
find their fullest expression.  
 
Let me venture to make explicit how these two concepts might address deficiencies in 
the traditions of non-domination mentioned above. One issue for an agonistic 
conception of politics is to explain why the openness of a state to contestation is 
necessarily good. What guarantee is there that the contestation is not a mere conflict 
of brute power, against which it would be better to put in place protections and 
limitations? Why is political 'agonism' desirable and not something that we should 
seek to overcome? Or in more cognitive terms, why should 'judgment' be prioritised 
over determinate norms; how does this avoid being subjective or arbitrary? It is 
against such fundamental skepticism that Skeaff's deployment of Spinoza's political 
philosophy is fruitful. Skeaff appeals to Spinoza's idea of immanent normativity, 
whereby political life has a non-arbitrary normative grain which nonetheless cannot 
be subsumed under a universal or fixed rule. Specifically, each human being has their 
own individual ingenium or complexion (the characteristic motions of their concrete 
embodied existence), for which certain things are useful utile and others thwarting. 
For Spinoza, virtue is nothing other than expressing and developing this individual 
nature, as we all strive to do to the best of our ability, and do better in proportion as 
we improve our reason. But Spinozist reason is not monolithic: the diversity of 
ingenia means that there is no single dictate of reason given for everyone and for all 
time; in Skeaff's terms, each must exercise their own judgment. When the state does 
not seek to suppress this diversity, then it maximises its subjects' flourishing and in 
turn maximises its own flourishing. Democratic state sovereignty stands as necessary 
but insufficient to this maximisation. The state must establish laws to resulate 
interactions amongst diverse citizens. But at the same time, due to the very same 
embodied diversity, any such laws (or indeed any meta-rules for democratic politics) 
are only provisional. Thus we have 'vital republicanism': a political order governed by 
laws, but those laws themselves continually regenerated and reformulated by the 
immanent normativity of the political entity, articulated through the 'democratic 
judgment' of its citizens. 
 
Becoming Political thus makes welcome contributions to both Spinoza studies and to 
contemporary political theory. My key reservation is that the book needs to do more 
to unpack the link between judgment and democracy. 
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First, granting (for the sake of argument) that the immanent normativity of a political 
order has a democratic structure, I was left unclear what accounts for Skeaff's 
confidence that this immanent normativity will tend to be expressed. Skeaff appears 
to take the view that appropriately egalitarian popular contestation to sovereignty will 
just emerge: formal democratic institutions and rights of free speech make the people 
individually sui juris, in control of their own right and able to exercise democratic 
judgment (for instance, see his discussion of the Black Lives Matter movement). 
Textually, this confidence relies heavily on the Theological-Political Treatise's 
famous characterisation of democracy as a regime in which formal political equality 
allows everyone to take part in making the laws and thereby maintain their freedom 
(Spinoza 2016a: 16.36). But even though the passage is famous, I think it is 
theoretically simplistic, and at odds with other elements of Spinoza's philosophy. 
Skeaff's own Chapter 2 grants that collective passional dynamics can go wrong; he 
also grants that the English revolution in Spinoza's own time failed to advance 
democracy. But in his discussion of contemporary democracy, he presumes that 
popular pressure will go right. Such a presumption seems to me to be contrary to 
Spinoza's own injunction to consider human behaviour 'like a thunderstorm' (Spinoza 
2016b: 1.4): one needs to focus on its bad and troublesome aspects, with view to 
understanding their determinate causes. Specifically, what about when citizens fail to 
be exemplary citizens, and are animated by exclusionary rather than egalitarian 
passions? What about the fact that formally equal citizens are often not substantively 
sui juris, because they find themselves in relations of dependency (whether economic, 
occupational, informational, or something else) (Spinoza 2016b: 2.8-11) In these 
cases, popular judgment may have no particular connection to democratic and 
egalitarian outcomes. Skeaff's book could usefully be complemented by a more 
critical theory of popular judgment and its conditions of democratic success. 
 
Second, and perhaps more troubling, I was left unconvinced that Spinoza's own 
understanding of political immanent normativity is so clearly democratic as Skeaff 
makes out. For Skeaff, the link between judgment and democracy seems to be 
grounded in the presumption that judgment is a unified whole: in particular, Skeaff 
doesn't seriously countenance the possibility of the philosophical or religious exercise 
of judgment and expression of ingenium being separated from the political exercise of 
judgment and equal political participation. But this is exactly the separation that 
Spinoza sanctions for commoners in an aristocracy. On the one hand, commoners 
should be allowed to pursue their own ends under fair terms, unmolested, and with 
religious and philosophical freedom. But on the other hand, they must be vigorously 
and systematically prevented from exerting political pressure on the patrician rulers 
(Spinoza 2016b: 8.4-7). If this is done, aristocracy is presented as a regime which can 
be highly virtuous and sui juris, more so than many actually existing democracies. To 
be sure, good politics requires taking into account many and diverse points of 
judgment, but this can be ensured by maintaining a large and active decisionmaking 
council drawn from a wide patrician class. To be sure, the point of politics is not to 
transform humans into beasts or automata, but this is hardly the status of the 
commoners: they may be as philosophically and ethically developed as they like, they 
simply cannot participate in political decisions. To be sure, humans strive for what is 
useful to them and their community, but in the history of political thought the 
common good has often been conceived in an inegalitarian way, and it is not clear to 
me that Spinoza is so unequivocally modern as Skeaff presumes. 
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In sum, I do wonder whether Skeaff presents an excessively generous image of 
Spinoza as a theorist of democracy. But this does not count strongly against the book: 
after all, such an image is pervasive in contemporary Spinoza studies. Skeaff's 
achievement is to make the case for connecting Spinoza's politics with contemporary 
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